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Abstract—Over the last decades, numerous security and pri-
vacy issues in all three active mobile network generations have
been revealed that threaten users as well as network providers.
In view of the newest generation (5G) currently under develop-
ment, we now have the unique opportunity to identify research
directions for the next generation based on existing security and
privacy issues as well as already proposed defenses. This paper
aims to unify security knowledge on mobile phone networks
into a comprehensive overview and to derive pressing open
research questions. To achieve this systematically, we develop
a methodology that categorizes known attacks by their aim,
proposed defenses, underlying causes, and root causes. Further,
we assess the impact and the efficacy of each attack and defense.
We then apply this methodology to existing literature on attacks
and defenses in all three network generations. By doing so, we
identify ten causes and four root causes for attacks.
Mapping the attacks to proposed defenses and suggestions
for the 5G specification enables us to uncover open research
questions and challenges for the development of next-generation
mobile networks. The problems of unsecured pre-authentication
traffic and jamming attacks exist across all three mobile gener-
ations. They should be addressed in the future, in particular to
wipe out the class of downgrade attacks and, thereby, strengthen
the users’ privacy. Further advances are needed in the areas of
inter-operator protocols as well as secure baseband implementa-
tions. Additionally, mitigations against denial-of-service attacks
by smart protocol design represent an open research question.
Index Terms—Security Research, Mobile Networks, GSM,
UMTS, LTE, 5G, Systematization of Knowledge
I. INTRODUCTION
OVER the past decades, mobile communication has be-come an integral part of our daily life. For instance,
in 2016 the mobile network comprised 4.61 billion users [1]
and the revenue of all mobile network operators totaled 1,331
billion USD [2]. In many markets, the number of mobile
Internet subscribers has outnumbered the stationary ones.
A vast and diverse mobile communication and application
ecosystem has emerged. These applications include private as
well as business communication, and even critical infrastruc-
tures. For example, payment services, energy infrastructure,
and emergency services (e. g., FirstNet [3]) highly depend on
mobile networks. As a consequence, the reliability and security
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of mobile networks have become a substantial aspect of our
daily lives.
However, over the last years, a large body of literature
has revealed numerous security and privacy issues in mobile
networks. There is a broad set of attacks [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9] that affect the users’ privacy and data secrecy, the
mobile network operators’ revenue, and the availability of the
infrastructure. Various countermeasures against these attacks
have been proposed, some of which have become security
features of new mobile generations. Besides the academic
community, the non-academic community also substantially
contributed to the comprehension of mobile network secu-
rity. Unfortunately, attacks and countermeasures were mostly
considered in an isolated manner and the research efforts
have not been systematized or categorized into a big picture.
However, these insights are necessary to develop generic
countermeasures instead of separate fixes or mitigations. For
example, messages being exchanged before the authentication
and key agreement is the cause of multiple attacks [4], [10],
[11]. Considering the attacks separately, one might not assume
that this is a broader problem present in all three mobile
generations.
As network standards tend to stay in use for decades, struc-
tural or backwards-incompatible changes are only possible for
new network generations. We would like to use the window of
opportunity with regards to 5G for the development of future
mobile security specifications in order to eliminate insecure
legacies. While considering the next mobile network genera-
tion, we systematized the research efforts of the last decades
to improve and provide a basis for future security research
and specifications. Since the contributions in mobile network
security research are fragmented, we develop a methodology to
categorize attacks and their countermeasures and thus provide
an abstract overview on the topic. We project the design errors
and attacks across the network generations to illustrate the
specifications’ development. Furthermore, we give an outlook
on future developments in mobile communication and map the
extracted issues to them. Finally, we identify open research
questions regarding mobile network security and point out
challenges for future specifications.
The scope of our survey is on the technical side of mobile
networks (Figure 1) to fill a blank space between highly
researched topics. There are surveys on mobile applications
such as secure messaging systems [12] and mobile operating
systems, e. g., Android [13]. On the other hand, there are
generic Internet security surveys [14] and telephony secu-



















2Recently, Jover [18] pointed out 5G security challenges, but
without systematizing prior work.
In summary, the main contributions of this article are as
follows:
• We develop a systematization methodology for attacks
and defenses in mobile networks. Starting from security
requirements, we classify the attacks by their aims. We
use attack characteristics for estimating the attack impact,
e. g., different attacker capabilities. Defenses characteris-
tics help us to describe the advancement for defenses. To
gain an abstract overview on the topic, we logically group
technical attacks and defenses into causes and high-level
root causes.
• We categorize and systematize attacks and defenses on
mobile networks using our systematization methodology
to obtain a comprehensive picture of research in this
field. To this end, we incorporate publications from
the academic as well as non-academic communities to
represent the big picture.
• We derive open research questions and challenges
building upon our systematization for further studies in
both offensive and defensive work. We do this to shape
the future research in the field of mobile network security.
In order to achieve this, we investigate the shortcomings
of existing work, the implications of future technologies,
and the concrete challenges of defenses. We underline
the challenges of future technologies by mapping impli-
cations of 5G technologies to open research questions.
II. MOBILE NETWORK BACKGROUND
In the following, we briefly describe the technical back-
ground of mobile networks, including an overview of the
currently active generations and a generic overview of the
network architecture.
A. Generations
Over the years, the requirements for mobile networks have
shifted from rather single-purpose networks (voice service) to
multi-purpose networks (data). In the following, we introduce
the currently active network generations.
• GSM (2G, Global System for Mobile Communica-
tions) is the first digital mobile communication system
and was designed for voice transmissions. It uses circuit-
switched scheduling in which fixed slots are allocated for
transmissions over the air and on network components
along the transmission path. The General Packet Radio
Service (GPRS) is a packet-switched extension on top of
the circuit-switched architecture.
• UMTS (3G, Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System): In order to meet the increasing demand for
data transmissions, the next generation was optimized for
data transmission on the radio layer. Additionally, UMTS
added new security features such as mutual authentication
and new encryption algorithms. Although the network is
packet-switched in its core, voice and SMS transmissions
are still offered as distinct network services.
Fig. 1. Generic mobile network architecture and the scope of this paper.
• LTE (4G, Long Term Evolution) uses a completely re-
designed radio layer and a strict IP-based packet-switched
architecture with guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS)
classes. In contrast to its predecessors, voice and SMS
transmissions are no longer network services, but offered
as IP-based services (SIP, VoIP) on top of a general-
purpose IP data network. However, fallback options exists
for phones or operators which do not support Voice over
LTE (VoLTE) [19, Sec. 8.2].
Names and abbreviations for equivalent network compo-
nents and concepts vary between the different network gen-
erations. Overall, we try to stay agnostic to the generations
and access technologies. If we need to specially differentiate
between different terms, we denote them with a 2G for GSM,
3G for UMTS, and 4G for LTE.
B. Network Architecture
Figure 1 shows a generic network architecture including the
scope of this paper. In general, the architecture consists of the
following components:
1) User Equipment: The User Equipment (UE)4G (e. g.,
smartphone) is the device utilized to communicate with the
network and consume its services. It comprises different
components, such as the application processor that runs the
mobile operating system, the graphical user interface, and
all its locally installed applications. The baseband processor
implements the mobile protocol stacks for multiple network
generations and thereby establishes the communication with
the network. The SIM2G/USIM3G,4G (Universal Subscriber
Identity Module) directly identifies a customer and stores
the authentication information as a pair of the permanent
identity (IMSI, International Mobile Subscriber Identity) and
the secret long-term symmetric key used for encryption and
authentication. From outside, a user is identifiable and thus
callable via a public phone number (called Mobile Station Inte-
grated Services Digital Network Number (MSISDN)). Besides
permanent identities, for privacy reasons temporary identities
are dynamically allocated to the UE, such as a Temporary
3Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) that is used for paging and
core network communication.
2) Radio Access Network: The purpose of the Radio
Access Network (RAN) is to transmit data between the UE and
the core network that provides service to the user. Therefore,
the mobile phone establishes a radio connection to the base
station (BTS2G, nodeB3G, eNodeB4G) that acts as a network
access point. For mobility management, base stations are
organized into cells which are in turn grouped for circuit-
switched services into Location Areas (LAs)2G,3G, and for
packet-switched services into Routing Areas (RAs)2G,3G and
Tracking Areas (TAs)4G.
3) Core Network: The core network’s task is to manage the
connection mobility and to deliver the services, e. g., phone
calls and Internet connection. For this mobility management,
several core network elements are utilized. A central database,
the Home Location Register (HLR)2G or Home Subscriber
Server (HSS)3G,4G, stores the authentication, mapping, and
other information about the users. Its security functionality is
often referred as Authentication Center (AuC). Core network
elements manage the mobility, connection, and security es-
tablishment. Signalling System #7 (SS7) is used within GSM
and UMTS networks for signaling purposes such as mobility
management and call setup as well as externally for roaming.
SS7 was developed in the mid-1970s for landline networks and
was later extended for mobile telephony networks. Unfortu-
nately, the protocol only provides limited security mechanisms.
Today, SS7 is mostly used as an SS7-over-IP adaptation.
LTE introduced new IP-based protocols for the core-network
infrastructure, e. g., the SIP-based IP Multimedia Subsystem
(IMS) handles voice, video, and text messages.
4) Inter Network: Many services require a connection to
other communication networks such as the Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) or the Internet leading to the
introduction of subsystems and gateways.
Mobile networks are connected to each other via SS7 or
its successor, the Diameter protocol for global inter-network
operator roaming, text messages, and call forwarding. Diam-
eter inherited most of the SS7 semantics, but offers improved
authentication and confidentiality through the use of IPsec and
Transport Layer Security (TLS).
5) Radio Channel: The radio layer shares some common
design choices between GSM, UMTS, and LTE, whereas
other characteristics like frequencies, modulation, or access
technologies are highly individual. All generations incorpo-
rate three main types of logical channels into the physical
radio channel: (i) Broadcast control channels carry informa-
tion about the base station, its neighbors, and the network
configuration. (ii) Paging channels are used to call out for
specific UEs when the network wants to transmit data to
them. (iii) Dedicated channels are used for traffic to and from
each single device. These are the only channels that can be
encrypted and integrity protected, if initiated by the network.
6) Pre-Authentication Traffic and Security Establishment:
Unless initiated by the network, the traffic is unencrypted, not
integrity protected and, thus, not authenticated. This means
that only dedicated traffic to and from a specific device is
secured. Thus paging, other broadcasts, most of the radio
resource allocations, and low-level signaling traffic are always
unprotected. All traffic that happens before the setup of an
authenticated session is defined as pre-authentication traffic.
The authenticated session is established via an
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol which
is a challenge-response protocol, that authenticates the
partner(s) and derives a session key for the communication.
While GSM only establishes user authentication, newer
generations (UMTS, LTE) establish mutual authentication.
The session keys are derived from a common long-term
shared secret stored in the (U)SIM. The particular used
AKA depend on the deployed SIM, the operators AuC, and
the access technology. On GSM, the example algorithm
COMP128 became the de-facto standard [20, Ch. 16], albeit
operators could issue SIMs with a custom algorithm. In
later generation key derivations are split between the UE
and the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) where
the publicly reviewed Milenage (and TUAK) algorithms are
used. Operators are still able to customize AuC’s and USIM’s
algorithms.
7) Mobility Management and Paging: When no active data
transmission or phone call is ongoing, the phone goes into the
idle state. In this state, the network only knows the coarse Lo-
cation Area where the subscriber is located. The phone listens
to the paging channel as an incoming phone call, message,
or data triggers a paging message of the subscriber in the
Location Area. Upon receiving a paging message, the phone
contacts the network and requests a dedicated (logical) channel
for further communication. Thus, only if the phone switches
to another Location Area (circuit switched), it has to inform
the network using a Location Update Request. Additionally,
the phone sends periodic location updates at a low interval
(typically every 24h) to reassure the network of its continued
presence. Analogue semantics exist for Routing Areas and
Tracking Areas in packet-switched context. Additionally, each
cell broadcasts a list of neighbor cells (e. g., their frequencies)
to help the phone find these cells faster.
8) RAN Sessions and Data Tunnels: As most data services
need stable addresses, tunnels are used between the UE and an
IP endpoint. These tunnels hide the mobile network’s mobility
management and also allow to offer multiple connections to
different IP networks, such as Internet access or private net-
works. Tunnels terminate at the packet gateways (Packet Data
Network Gateway, P-GW4G). If necessary, Network Address
Translation (NAT) middleboxes separate the mobile network
from the Internet by translating the private IP address and port
to a public IP address and port. Tunnels aim at guaranteeing
certain QoS parameters, such as latency or bandwidth.
III. METHODOLOGY OF SYSTEMATIZATION
In this section, we introduce our systematization methodol-
ogy that we apply to categorize attacks on mobile networks
and their defenses. In the course of this article, we recognize
and formulate research questions and challenges for future
research based on this systematization.
4Fig. 2. Systematization methodology applied throughout this work. The letters correspond to the subsections of Section III where each aspect is described.
A. Methodology
We structure the systematization process according to the
flow depicted in Figure 2, beginning with the selection of
particular security requirements, continuing with the assess-
ment of recent attacks and defenses, and resulting in a set of
research questions and challenges to shape future research in
mobile network security. This process allows us to incorporate
multiple aspects of offensive and defensive previous work
resulting in a high-level perspective on essential root causes
of security issues.
Security requirements define concrete features to protect
mobile networks and their users. Such requirements are chal-
lenged by attack aims, i. e., the major interests of an attacker
(Table I). Accordingly, attacks are instantiations of these at-
tack aims and exploit existing vulnerabilities in the definitions
and implementations of systems or system components. In
order to assess the impact of attacks on the mobile network,
we use a set of attack characteristics that give a precise
definition of an adversary’s technical and organizational ca-
pabilities, e. g., the preliminaries for an attack. We assess the
scope of existing defenses in relation to known attack vectors
(Table III) and aggregate defense characteristics to assess
their research and deployment status. However, multiple flaws
are often manifestations of a broader problem that we define
as a cause. Such causes facilitate the differentiation of attacks
into distinct classes, thus allowing to derive open research
questions and challenges in relation to the current state of the
art. All causes are grouped into four fundamental root causes,
which form the logical structure of our systematization.
Below, we give a short example to illustrate the application
of this method.
Example: Radio Measurement Reports are used for
the maintenance of radio access networks and can be
requested by a base station without authentication. This
flaw can be exploited via the Radio Measurement Report
Request Attack that allows an attacker with active radio
capabilities to pinpoint a victim [4]. Hence, this attacks
the user’s privacy (attack aim) as it breaks the location
confidentiality requirement. The attack can be executed in
the non-authenticated state of UEs, allowing an active at-
tacker to fake measurement report requests. Therefore, the
flaw is that requests for Radio Measurement Reports are
part of the unsecured pre-authentication traffic (cause).
As this is a legitimate request according to the specifi-
cation, the root cause lies in the specification. A pro-
posed mitigation is to require this specific request to be
authenticated. However, this does not fix the underlying
general problem of insecure pre-authentication traffic. A
generic solution would be to eliminate pre-authenticated
traffic completely, as it is the source of many other
vulnerabilities as well. An open research question is
how to develop a privacy-preserving specification while
keeping the maintainability of mobile networks.
Coverage of Literature: We focus on academic research,
i. e., scientifically peer-reviewed publications, as a foundation
for the assessment. In addition, we use non-academic research
(including publications, presentations, and demonstrations at
hacker venues) and white papers from industry. Even though
these publications are not peer-reviewed, they complement the
academic body of the systematization with a comprehensive
picture of mobile network security. In particular, the hacker
community has contributed a lot to the understanding of
mobile protocols [21] and has provided tools that academic
researchers have built upon.
We require that the literature must present security- or
privacy-related attacks and defenses and need to be unique
to mobile networks and not focus solely on applications. We
specifically exclude mobile operating systems security and
common challenges of the public phone network. Preferen-
tially, the literature should have a high impact, e. g., it affects
many users, is operable from a large distance, or produces
considerable damage.
Structure: We base the structure of our systematization
(Sections V–VIII) on the root causes, and each section is
further grouped into causes. Thus, attacks that are evoked by
the same cause and root cause are logically grouped together.
Mitigations and solutions are discussed directly within the re-
spective subsections. Regarding the structure of this document,
we traverse the systematization process (Figure 2) backwards
from root causes, to causes, to attacks. Research questions
originate from causes, root causes, and the implications of 5G
technologies.
5B. Security Requirements
Security requirements describe the demands that need to
be met by the system in order to protect the interests of
its stakeholders. For our systematization, we aim to establish
generic and long-lasting security requirements spanning all
three mobile network generations. However, the standardiza-
tion bodies, e. g., 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP),
have issued diverging requirements over time, which is why,
they do not allow us to provide a holistic view and might
not fit modern security concepts. In order to define generic
and long-lasting security requirements, we therefore base our
work on the publication of Avizienis et al. [22] who define
a taxonomy of dependable and secure computing and general
security requirements that we underpin with some more con-
crete requirements published by the 3GPP [23], [24], [25].
1) Confidentiality: Avizienis et al. [22] define confidential-
ity as the “absence of unauthorized disclosure of information”.
This statement is substantiated by the 3GPP with the following
requirement: “the network shall provide several appropriate
levels of user privacy including communication confidentiality,
location privacy, and identity protection” [23, p. 33]. In detail,
this means [23]:
• Communication confidentiality: “[. . . ] contents, origin,
and destination of a particular communication shall be
protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties”.
• Identity protection: The network shall “hide the identities
of users from unauthorized third parties”.
• Location privacy: The network shall “hide the user loca-
tion from unauthorized parties”.
2) Availability: Availability denotes the readiness and the
continuity of correct services [22]. With the pervasiveness
of mobile communications in our everyday lives, availability
becomes a crucial factor for customers as well as part of
critical infrastructures [3], [26].
3) System Integrity: In contrast to data or transmission
integrity, system integrity focuses on the hard- and software
of the network components. Integrity is defined as the absence
of unauthorized system alterations [22]. System integrity is an
essential security requirement as it is crucial for the proper
operation and trustworthiness of the system.
4) Unauthorized Service Access and Correct Charging:
The service should only be accessible to authorized par-
ties [23]. This requirement includes correct recording and
offsetting call data records and other chargeable items [27].
In other words, a proper authorization and charging system
should only allow subscribed services to be consumed and it
should charge the right user for the correct volume [28].
Subsequently, we will use these high-level security require-
ments to assign an attack aim to each identified attack that
challenges one or more of those requirements.
C. Attack Aims
Each attack has a clear primary aim that challenges one
of the identified security requirements. An attacker might
also pursue a secondary attack aim. For example, using side-
channels, an attacker can obtain the shared key on the SIM
card that undermines primarily the secrecy aim. However,
the attacker might also clone the SIM card for free calls
and thereby commit fraud attacks (secondary). We define five
distinct attack aims:
• Attacks on Privacy: This aim covers all attacks that
undermine the privacy of the user, including the identity
protection and the location privacy.
• Attacks on Secrecy: This category includes attacks on
communication confidentiality, e. g., the content of the
transmission.
• Denial of Service: This attack aim contains all the
objectives that impact the availability of services, or parts
of them. Thus, downgrade attacks, such as disabling
encryption or stepping back to less secure protocols
belong here.
• Attacks on Integrity: This category comprises all the
attempts which undermine the requirements for system
integrity.
• Fraud Attacks: This aim covers attacks that aim towards
directly or indirectly targeting financial benefits for the
attacker or financial losses for others. Direct under-billing
attacks dodge service charges at the expense of the
operator, whereas direct over-billing produces financial
loss to customers. Indirect fraud includes scams or spam
via telephone.
D. Attacks
Attacks exploit system flaws under the defined attack aims.
We use the following characteristics for an assessment of
the attack impact (see Table I). In general, as for Table I, denotes a fully applicable attack for the characteristic,G# refers to limitations, and # characterizes attacks that are
not applicable.
1) Attacker Capabilities: For mobile radio attacks, an
attacker often combines several capabilities to perform an
attack (e. g., retrieving session keys over SS7 and passively
monitoring and decoding traffic); thus, we describe the attacker
model as a set of distinct capabilities (i. e., building blocks).
We assume that the attacker is a-priori not in possession of any
private information (secret keys) of the victim, but might be
in possession of public identifiers such as the phone number
(MSISDN).
• Passive Radio: An attacker with passive radio capabilities
is able to capture radio transmissions, decode signals, and
read raw messages. The recent developments of Software
Defined Radios (SDRs) and re-purposed hardware render
this type of attack quite affordable [29], [30].
• Active Radio: An attacker with this capability has full
control over radio transmissions and is therefore able
to put arbitrary messages on the radio channel. This
enables an attacker to setup a own base station or a fully
controllable phone stack using an SDR [9], [29], [30],
[31], [32], [33].
• User Traffic: The attacker is able to control or initiate
traffic on a commodity mobile phone. The phone per-
forms normal radio emissions, but the attacker accesses
the higher (user-land controlled) network layers (e. g., IP)
or dedicated network services (e. g., SMS). In most cases,
this ability does not require a rooted or jail-broken phone.
6• SS7/Diameter Interface: An attacker with access to
SS7/Diameter is able to send and receive Signalling Sys-
tem #7 or Diameter messages to and from other networks.
Some network providers even sell these services [34].
• Nondestructive Physical: A nondestructive-physical at-
tacker temporarily has physical access to the victim’s
device, but neither destroys nor modifies hardware or
software. Thus, the attack leaves no visible or measurable
trace. We exclude the destructive attacker, because these
visible traces would raise doubts by the users.
• PSTN Interface: An attacker has access to voice or
text services of the Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN).
• Internet Traffic: An attacker with the ability to access the
Internet in a way that can specifically contact the victim’s
phone. That can be achieved by knowing the phone’s
public IP address and the TCP/UDP port mapping on
the operator’s packet gateway. Other possibilities include
identifiers of chat services, instant messaging apps, or
cloud messaging services (such as Google Cloud Mes-
saging (GCM) [35] or Apple’s Push Notifications [36]),
and the ability to transfer such messages.
2) Limitations of Attacker Capabilities: For our system-
atization, we assume that the operator’s authorized personnel
is trusted and thus exclude such attacker capabilities from
systematization. However, such attacks have occurred in the
past and are a threat to the mobile user’s data secrecy and
privacy [37], [38]. For instance, in the 2005 Vodafone Greece
incident [37], a staff technician was suspected to have planted
a backdoor in mobile switches that allowed copying traffic
on government phones. In the Gemalto SIM key material
theft [38], secret key material for the SIM cards was trans-
ferred by the use of unprotected means. However, such attacker
capabilities are beyond the scope of this paper, as the attackers
had the permissions in the first place and deliberately misused
them.
3) Target: The target category depicts who is harmed by
the attack, and if there is a relation to other categories, e. g.,
privacy attacks predominantly target the user. We focus on
the primary goal and disregard secondary effects such as bad
publicity due to data breaches.
4) Technology: This category maps the applicability of an
attack to the three major access technology generations and
assesses if there has been a security development, e. g., if
defenses have been introduced in later access technologies,
or if new technologies open new attack vectors. The former
does not necessarily prevent attacks, as multiple downgrade
attacks are known.
For example, only GSM lacks mutual authentication
(cause), hence it is prone to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) at-
tacks. However, UMTS and LTE are open to various down-
grade attacks; therefore the problem will not be resolved until
phones stop to (unconditionally) support GSM. Downgrade
attacks that trick or force a specific party to fall back on
older and less secure access technology must be kept in mind
when discussing fixes or mitigations for new access technology
generations. We filed downgrade attacks as part of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, as they deserve a separate review.
5) Range: The range of an attack is an indirect indicator of
impact and cost. A higher range (e. g., a globally performable
attack) increases its impact and versatility and might justify
higher costs for an attacker. In contrast, an attack that requires
more physical vicinity increases involvement of the attacker
and reduces the set of victims. In Table I, we classify the range
by technical boundaries: Physical access (Phy), same radio
cell including simulated ones (Cell), same location area (LA),
same network (Net), and globally executable attacks (Glo).
E. Flaw
For our systematization, we define a flaw as a specific and
distinct vulnerability that is exploited by a particular attack.
We coalesced attacks that exploit the same technical flaw or
are otherwise very similar in their technical or operational
principle. This leads to a 1:1 relationship between flaws and
attacks.
F. Cause
We group flaws that have similar technical or organizational
reasons via a common cause. A cause is a broader technical
reason summarizing multiple individual flaws and, if dealt with
appropriately, would foil an entire class of attacks.
G. Root cause
Root causes are the underlying reason for certain classes of
attacks; they are defined on an abstract level and independent
from technology. Each root cause summarizes particular flaws
and vulnerabilities according to their structural or causal
dependency (Table II) and is completely disjoint from other
root causes. We use this abstract structure as the foundation
for our systematization.
H. Defenses
In order to systematize and assess the defenses presented
in the literature, we relate them to attacks, causes, and root
causes. We show the coverage of the suggested defenses in
Table III. If a defense encounters all the attacks of a cause,
it can be considered a generic defense, otherwise it is a
specialized defense. We differentiate between two kinds of
defenses, namely, detections (G#) and mitigations ( ). While
the detection of an attack is an important step to impede losses
or disadvantages, it does not ultimately prevent the attack.
Mitigations foil attacks by fixing the underlying flaw or by
making attacks very unlikely to succeed.
Additionally, we evaluated the defenses according to a set of
quality characteristics that help to assess the realization effort,
the sustainability, and the current research status of a defense.
1) Realization Method: The realization method (Table III)
specifies how a defense is achieved. A specification de-
fense (S) needs to pass the 3GPP change-request process, such
as protocol changes, to guarantee the interoperability. It has
a higher realization effort time-wise, as it needs to pass the
specification process. However, it will potentially reach more
people in the long run, as new products are likely to implement
such measures. In contrast, implementation defenses (I) do
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2G 3G 4G Phy Cell LA Net Glo
Service Signaling DoS [39], [40], [41], [42]   # # # # # U,P    #  # # # V-E1
Attach Request Attack [43]   # # # # # P    #  # # # V-E1
GPS Receiver Denial of Service [44], [45] #  # # # # # U  # # #  # # # V-A1
Continuous Wideband Jamming [46], [47], [48], [49] #  # # # # # U,P    #  # # # VIII-A
Protocol-Aware Selective Jamming [46], [47], [48], [50]   # # # # # U,P # #  #  # # # VIII-A
IPv4/IPv6 Middleboxes Misconfiguration [41], [51] # #  # #  # U,P # #  # # #  # VII-A1
SMS Link Saturation [52], [53] # # # G# #  # U,P    # # # #  V-E1
Paging Response Race DoS [54]   # # # # # P  ? ? #  # # # V-A1
DDoS HLR: Activate Call Forwarding Request [55] # #  # # # # P   # # # # G# # V-E1
Insert/Delete Subscriber Data into the VLR/MSC [56] # # #  # # # U    # # # #  V-D1
Secrecy (U)SIM: COMP128v1 and MILENAGE Side-Channels [57], [58], [59] # # # # # #  U     # # # # VI-B1
Baseband State Machine Exploits [60], [61], [62], [63] #  # # # # # U    #  # # # VI-A1
Encryption Downgrade [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69] #  # # # # # U  # # #  # # # V-B1
SIM Key Extraction via COMP128v1 Cryptoanalysis [70], [71], [72] # # # # # #  U  # #  # # # # V-C1c
Weak Key due to Inter-Technology Handover [73]   # # # # # U #  ? #  # # # V-C1c
Inter eNodeB User Plane Key Desynchronization Attack [74]  # # # # # # U # #  #  # # # V-C1c
Key Reusage Across Cipher and Network Generations [75]   # # # # # U  G# ? #  # # # V-C1c
MitM IMSI Catcher [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69]   # # # # # U  # # #  # # # V-B1
Passive Over-the-Air Decryption of A5/1 and A5/2 [75], [76], [76], [77],
[78], [79], [80], [81]
 # # # # # # U  # # #  # # # V-C1c
Intercepting Calls with SS7/CAMEL [56] # # #  # # # U   ? # # # #  V-D1
Session Key Retrieval via SS7 [56], [66]  # #  # # # U   ? #  # # G# V-D1
Privacy AKA Protocol Linkability Attack [7], [82]   # # # # # U #   #  # # # V-A1
IMSI Paging Attack [7]   # # # # # U    #  # # # V-A1
Location Leak by SIP Message [83] # #  # # # # U # #  # # # #  VII-A1
Location/Tracking Area not Allowed (Downgrade) [4], [6], [84]   # # # # # U #   #  # # # V-A1
Measurement Reports Localization [4], [10]   # # # # # U # #  #  # # # V-A1
OTA SIM Card Update Key Reconstruction [85] #  # G# # # # U    # # # #  V-C1c
Unauthenticated IMEI Request [8], [64], [66], [67], [68], [69]   # # # # # U   # #  # # # V-A1
Unauthenticated IMSI Request (IMSI Catcher) [8], [9], [64], [65], [66],
[67], [68], [69]
  # # # # # U    #  # # # V-A1
TMSI Deanonymization (Paging Attack) [4], [5], [86]  # # G# G# G# # U   # #   # # V-A1
Cell-Level Tracking with SS7/MAP [56] # # #  # # # U    # # # #  V-D1
GPS Location with SS7/LCS [56] # # #  # # # U    # # # #  V-D1
Integrity ASN.1 Heap Overflow [87] #  # G# # # # U,P    #     VI-A1
Binary Baseband Exploit [11], [88], [89] #  # # # # # U    #  # # # VI-A1
SMS Parsing [90], [91] #  # # # # # U    #  # #  VI-A1
SIM Card Rooting [85] # G# G# G# # # # U      #   VI-A1
Fraud Fake Base Station SMS Spam [92], [93] #  # # # # # U  G# # #  # # # V-B1
LTE IMS-based SMS Spoofing [83], [94] # #  # # # # U # #  # # # #  VII-A1
Misbilling: TCP Retransmission or DNS Tunneling [95], [95], [96] # #  # # # # P #   # # #  # VII-B1
Underbilling using VoLTE Hidden Channels [97], [98] # #  # # # # P # #  # # #  # VII-B1
Uplink IP Header Spoofing/Cloak-and-Dagger Misbilling [28], [99] # #  # # # # U # #  # # #  # VII-A1
Unblock Stolen Devices [100] # # #  # # # U    # # # #  V-D1
 yes, applicable, needed for attack G# partially/supportive/optional # no, not applicable, or does not apply ? property unknown
8not depend on a specification and can be implemented directly
into network components. While this task can be accomplished
by a vendor, only users of an updated product benefit from it.
The realization method is an indicator of the effort, the
swiftness with which it can be rolled out, and the reachability.
2) Affected Components: On the right hand side of Ta-
ble III, we denote which network components need modi-
fications to implement a particular countermeasure. On the
one hand, it indicates who needs to take action to roll-out
a defense. On the other hand, as a rough estimate, the less
components are affected by a defense measure, the easier
it can be implemented in practice, and vice-versa. However,
particular updates on the UE are hard to roll out due to the
high number of units and manufacturers involved.
3) Deployment Status: The deployment status has more
a practical than a scientific value: It helps to evaluate the
feasibility of a defense, if information about its deployment is
available. A defense which has been deployed by at least one
operator can naturally be considered feasible. The following
notation is used:
• No information (?). No information about deployment.
• Not deployed (#). Not deployed by any operator.
• Partially deployed (G#). At least one operator or phone
that partially implements the defense.
• Fully deployed ( ). At least one operator or phone that
fully implements the countermeasure.
4) Research Status: In the literature, defenses are dis-
cussed at vastly different levels of detail. Some papers about
attacks conclude with rather vague defense proposals, while
other works focus on the concrete realization and evaluation
of a defense. The research status of a defense helps us to
disclose possible shortcomings of the existing work. For this,
we estimated the research status by examining the detail level
and evaluation degree of a defense proposal and denote three
status levels in Table III:
• Vague Proposal (#). A vague proposal mentions a
defense without any precise scheme or architecture.
• Concrete Proposal (G#). A concrete proposal is a de-
tailed scheme for a defense. However, the scheme is not
evaluated.
• Evaluated Proposal ( ). The security of the proposal
was comprehensively evaluated—preferably by more then
one literature source. The evaluation can be done either
theoretically and/or practically.
I. Research Questions and Challenges
From the assessment of attacks and countermeasures, we
derived open questions and challenges that should shape future
security research in context of 5G mobile security. Following
the systematization structure, we defined three leading ques-
tions or challenges for each cause:
Shortcomings of Existing Work. The limitations of prior
research lead to individual sets of shortcomings for the differ-
ent causes that we identified through our systematization. We
define concrete starting points to address these shortcomings
in future offensive and defensive work.
Concrete Challenge of Defenses. As we systematize the
defenses in the context of causes, we emphasize the problems
TABLE II
ROOT CAUSES RELATED TO CAUSES
Root Cause Cause





Implementation Issue Insecure Implementation
Leaky Implementation
Protocol Context Discrepancy Cross-Layer Information Loss
Accounting Policy Inconsistency
Wireless Channel Channel Characteristics
and challenges that all proposed defenses are trying to solve.
We evaluate if the defenses are successful and might encounter
multiple attacks in the cause. If they are not already solved
successfully or just covering a small amount of attacks in a
cause, we give starting points using literature of other related
disciplines in which similar problems were solved.
Security Implications of 5G. When possible, we match
these research questions onto the current 5G specification
development. As the 5G is currently under development,
we briefly refer to discussions and suggestions made within
technical reports [101]. This matching assists us in finding
the difference between current research and the specification
process. From today’s perspective, we point out security
challenges of 5G technologies that should be addressed by
future security research. To do this, we introduce the new
technologies as well as the associated 5G challenges.
IV. SYSTEMATIZATION OVERVIEW
In the following, we introduce the abstract root causes and
their individual causes as used in this systematization (see
Table II). Later, we present each cause in detail in relation to
attacks, defenses, and open research questions, following the
reverse process of Figure 2. The results regarding attacks are
condensed in Table I and as graph in Figure 3 (see Appendix).
Likewise, defenses are aggregated in Table III.
Specification Issues originate from incomplete, inaccurate,
or faulty definitions of system behavior and comprise five
individual causes: Unsecured Pre-Authentication Traffic allows
to send messages to the phone or network prior to the key
agreement and ciphering setup has taken place. Non-Existing
Mutual Authentication relates to an attack vector exclusive to
GSM networks, but is still an issue in recent technologies due
to downgrade attacks. The use of Weak Cryptography signif-
icantly reduces the required effort for attacks on encrypted
data, while Insecure Inter-Network Protocols undermine the
users’ privacy and confidentiality by poor protocol design
choices. Resource Usage Asymmetry enables an attacker to
perform cheap requests that result in intensive operations on
the network side and hence can lead to DoS.
Implementation Issues are either caused by Insecure Im-
plementations that open attack vectors in components of the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Frequent TMSI Reallocation [86], [102], [103] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G#  # # # # I ?  
Pseudonymous IMSI and Non-Static Identifiers [103], [104], [105],
[106], [107]
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # #  #       S # #
Asymmetric Cryptography with PKI [103], [108], [109] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #       #   # # # # # # # # # # #  # # #  # #  S G# #
Base Station Fingerprinting [64], [67], [68], [69], [92], [110], [111] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  G# G# # # # # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # I   
Geographic Mapping of Network Infrastructure [64], [67], [68], [69],
[112]
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # I   
Passive Behavioral Analysis of Control Traffic [69], [113] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # # # # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # I   
Location Updates Inconsistency Check [65] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # I G# ?
Round-Trip Time Analysis [65] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # I G# ?
Check for Disappearing Phones [114] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # I # ?
Collect Neighbor Cells IDs by Phones and BTSs [112] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # I G# ?
Monitor Radio Vicinity for Changing BTSs w/ dedicated HW [64],
[110], [115], [116]
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # I   
Paging Repeat Statistics [64] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # I  ?
Retrofitting Mutual Authentication to GSM [117], [118], [119], [120],
[121], [122]
# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #    # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  G# G# G#  # # # S G# #
Secure Key Derivation Function (e.g., MILENAGE) [123] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  #  # # #  # # # S   
Distinct Key Material and Key Derivation for Different Generations # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # #    # G#  # # # S ? #
Increase Session Key Update Interval [74] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # #  # # # # I  ?
Disable Direct eNodeB Handover [74] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # #  # # # # S  ?
Introduction of Secure Cipher to GSM (e.g., A5/3) [124] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # #  # G# # # # # S   
Disable A5/1 on Network # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # G# # # # # I ? ?
Disable A5/0 and A5/2 on Network [125] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # G# # # # # I ?  
Disable A5/0 on UE for Non-Emergency Calls # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # S ? #
Disable A5/1 on UE # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # #  # # # # # # S ? #
Disable A5/2 on UE [125] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # #  # # # # # # S ?  
GSM Random Padding [126], [126] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # G# # G# # # # # S   
SS7 Penetration Tests [127] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# G# G# G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # I G# G#
Stateful SS7 Firewall [128], [129] # # # # # # # # # # # # # #       # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # I G# G#
Migration to Diameter # # # # # # # # # # # # # #       # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # S G# ?
Statistical Attack Detection and Protection [39], [43], [52], [53], [55] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #     # # # # # # # #   # # # # I G# ?
SMS Parsing Test Framework [89], [90] # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # I ?  
State Machine Test Framework [61], [62] # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # I ?  
Filtering Malicious SMS [85] # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # #  # # # # I ?  
SMS Home Routing [130] # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # G# # # # G# S   
Memory-Safe Languages and Runtime-Environments [131], [132], [133] G#  #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # I G#  
Fully Machine-Readable Protocol Specifications # G# #   # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # S # G#
Fully Machine-Readable State Machine Specifications # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # S # G#
Constant Time and Power Specification Requirements [57], [58], [59] # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  G# # # # # # # S  ?
Secure Binding Across Networks Layers [28] # # # # # # # #    # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  #  # # I G# ?
Active Connection Deauthorization [28] # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  #  #  # # S G# ?
Feedback-Based Mischarge Correction [28] # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  #  #  # # S G# ?
Stateful IP Firewalls [41], [51], [97], [98] # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  #  # # I G# ?
Deep Packet Inspection and Ratio Detection [95], [95], [98] # # # # # #   # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # I G# ?
Spread-Spectrum Jamming Resiliency [134] # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #   # # # # # S # ?
Broadcast Encryption [134] # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #   G# # # # # S # #
Beam-Forming Scheme for Selective Jamming Cancellation [134] # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # I # ?
Countermeasures:  effective mitigation/solution G# detection, partial mitigation, probabilistic mitigation # not applicable
Components:  implementation requires changes of that component G# optional or minor changes # no changes necessary
Realization Method: S by specification change/amendment/extension I by implementation (update)
Research Status: # vague proposal G# concrete proposal  evaluated proposal
Deployment Status: ? unknown # not deployed or deployable G# partially deployed  deployed and known to work from at least one Carrier
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or by Leaky Implementations, which means that sensitive
information can be accessed through unintended side channels.
The root cause Protocol Context Discrepancy summarizes a
class of security issues which use a protocol differently or in
another environment than it was originally designed for. Cross-
Layer Information Loss occurs at the interface of different
layers in the network stack, e. g., when necessary, trustworthy
security information is lost between network layers. Account-
ing Policy Inconsistencies result from different accounting
schemes that can be played against each other, e. g., voice
data is charged in minutes, whereas other data is charged by
volume.
The Wireless Channel and its characteristics is essential
for the transmission of information in mobile communication
and comes with several physical limitations that impact the
security.
Following the structure of root causes, we discuss offensive
and defensive characteristics of specific causes and derive open
research questions and challenges for future mobile network
technologies.
V. ROOT CAUSE: SPECIFICATION ISSUE
Specifications ensure the interoperability between imple-
mentations by specifying protocols, state machines, and in-
terfaces. However, there may exists issues in the specification
that might lead to flaws that can be exploited by attackers. In
the specification-related root cause, we collate all flaws that are
based on specification issues. The reasons for these problems
range from technical trade-offs to political motivation.
A. Cause: Unsecured Pre-Authentication Traffic
The signaling traffic prior the security establishment with
the AKA protocol is unprotected: it is neither encrypted nor
integrity-protected and thus unauthenticated1. This leads to
implicit trust between the phone and the network. In this
unauthenticated state, the phone fully obeys the network, even
if the latter is not genuine. A malicious usage of messages in
this unauthenticated state can serve for downgrade, track, or
locate a specific user or handset.
1) Attacks: One prominent example for attacks based on
unsecured pre-authentication is the deployment of fake base
stations. Fake base stations (also known as rogue or fraudulent
base stations, IMSI Catchers, cell-site simulators, a DRT-Box,
or by product names such as Stingray) are active devices
simulating a genuine base station to the phone by broadcasting
genuine network identifiers. These fake base stations exploit
the fact that mobile phones cannot verify the authenticity of
the network prior to the AKA protocol.
In the unauthenticated state, the attacker is allowed to ask
for the permanent identity, such as the IMSI or IMEI, and can
thus undermine the user’s identity and location privacy [6],
[8], [9], [66], [67], [68], [82]. Besides obvious requests such
as the identity request, an attacker can also use more subtle
ways to determine the vicinity of a victim, e. g., with the AKA
linkability attack [7]. Additionally, an attacker can repeatedly
1In LTE some uplink data is integrity protected but not encrypted.
page the victim’s IMSI [7] and, thereby, determine if a user
is in radio range. Moreover, an attacker can retrieve a more
precise location by requesting measurement reports from the
victim’s handset [4], [10] enabling an attacker to track a victim
or to request the identity of people within radio range.
Furthermore, unsecured pre-authentication traffic allows
downgrade attacks to a less secure access technology by
denying service using the tracking area update reject or a
combination of other messages [4], [6], [84]. This serves as
a stepping stone for further attacks such as the GSM MitM
attack (Section V-B1). Additionally, a fake base station can
disable the location service on some phones from the late
2000s by sending out the country code of Egypt, because
GPS receivers used to be forbidden in Egypt at that time [135,
p. 28], [44], [45]. Furthermore, Golde et al. [54] showed that
unsecured pre-authentication uplink traffic in GSM can be
misused for a DoS attack dropping calls in the entire location
area by winning the race answering paging requests. This is
a problem of the GSM state-machine specification, as it can
not recover once it proceeds to the ciphering setup.
The missing protection of broadcast and paging messages
also enables attacks that retrieve the temporary identity of a
victim by triggering the paging process multiple times and
statically analyzing the paged TMSIs [4], [5]. An attacker can
trigger the paging procedure in multiple ways: for example,
with targeted Internet traffic, a short phone call and immediate
hang-up, e. g., before the ring starts, or with a Silent SMS that
is a text message which is silently discarded by the phone
[136].
Assessment: Attacks based on unauthenticated uplink traffic
or on passively exploitable downlink traffic are vastly out-
numbered by active radio attacks based on pre-authentication
traffic. While potentially having a very severe impact, an active
radio attacker is limited to his/her radio vicinity. Most of
these attacks undermine the victim’s data or location privacy.
Many commercially available products exploit unsecured pre-
authentication traffic [137], [138], hence making it a high
priority to be addressed.
2) Defenses: The research community proposed and imple-
mented multiple detection and mitigation techniques against
fake base stations. Detection schemes against the client include
geographical mapping (e. g., via GPS) of the network structure
to detect new—and possible fraudulent—base stations, finding
unusual frequency or cell parameter configurations, and be-
havioral analysis of base stations. Some are implemented as
smartphone apps [64], [68], [69], [92] others use dedicated
smartphones with baseband firewalls [113]. Furthermore, a
sensor network can detect such changes [64], [110], [139].
Recently, operator-based detection schemes were proposed
[65], [112], [114]. Some of these approaches also detect large-
scale paging race attacks [64].
Besides detection schemes, mitigations and fixes based on
protocol changes have been proposed. An ephemeral identifier,
e. g., dynamic IMSI or pseudonymic IMSI (P-IMSI) instead
of the static IMSI has been proposed [93], [104], [105]. All
of them protect against an unauthorized IMSI request by
providing a new, seemingly unrelated number as the identifier
for each request. However, the ephemeral identifier require
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severe changes to the network structure as the IMSI is used
as a primary key to link all the subscriber-related information
in a network. Additionally, protocol changes have been pro-
posed against the paging response race attack and the AKA
linkability attacks [7], [11].
Besides these specialized solutions, securing the paging
and other broadcast traffic would eliminate the cause for
all these attacks, e. g., using a source origin authentication
scheme. Some proposed options are based upon asymmetric
cryptography with a public key infrastructure [101], [108],
[109] or upon broadcast authentication schemes [103].
Attacks that map a public identifier to the temporary
identifier (TMSI de-anonymization) are currently countered
by frequently changing TMSIs [4], [102], [103] even after
unsuccessful calls. Hong et al. pointed out that TMSI re-
allocation schemes lack randomness in the real world and
remain attackable [86]. A proper reallocation scheme must be
eimplemented by the operators for encountering the threat of
identity mapping attacks. The GSMMap project [140] provides
a rough estimation on the deployment of this workaround.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: The detection of
fake base stations via the handset (e.g., behavioral analysis) or
with externally deployed sensors only benefits a small number
of people or a certain geographical area.
Countermeasures based on protocol changes often have
a hard time to get through specifications for current net-
work generations, as they introduce non-backward-compatible
changes. For example, dynamic identifiers such as PMSI (as
a replacement for TMSI and IMSI) require deep changes
in many systems at once (VLR, HLR, Packet Gateways).
The importance of such measures influenced the 5G design
process and some of them might be included in the new
specification [101, §5.7.4.3 ff.]. However, they introduce the
risk of a permanent SIM card lock if the SIM and home
network HLR/HSS should get out of sync. New solutions
that address this need to be sought. In contrast, moving mea-
surement reports from an unauthenticated to an authenticated
protocol state is possible in current network generations, as the
functionality of currently deployed handsets is unaffected (but
stay vulnerable). However, in recent years, new vulnerabilities
based on pre-authentication traffic have been revealed [4]. In
conclusion, none of the proposed protocol changes abandons
non-protected pre-authenticated traffic in its entirety.
Thus, a more general approach is based on abandoning pre-
authentication traffic in particular – or unprotected signaling
in general – completely. Two main ideas have been proposed:
Schemes based on asymmetric cryptography and broadcast-
authentication schemes such as the TESLA protocol [103],
[108], [109], [141]. For example, 5G currently explores ways
to protect base station identity signatures using asymmetric
cryptography [101, §5.4.4.8]. However, both were not ex-
tensively researched in the context of mobile networks with
its limited bandwidth, power consumption restrictions, and
low computational USIM card. Another related question is,
if the protection of signaling uplink traffic from the UE to the
network would increase the over-all security of the system.
Such a general solutions would be desirable for future network
generations as to remove the entire threat class.
Nevertheless, formal analysis of proposed protocols should
prove the authenticity, confidentiality, privacy, and availability
requirements [7], [123], [142]. This can be either accomplished
by manually proving the protocols or the use of automated
tools.
Summary: Attacks based on pre-authentication traffic
affect the privacy and aim to downgrade the service.
Such attacks are possible across all three mobile genera-
tions. Defenses include either attack detection or protocol
changes that aim to mitigate specific attacks or abandon
the entire pre-authentication traffic. Future research must
focus on completely abandoning pre-authentication traf-
fic, e. g., with asymmetric cryptography. Automated and
manual inspection aid the goal of provable security by
identifying shortcomings.
B. Cause: Non-Existing Mutual Authentication
The original specification of GSM does not include network
authentication and, thus, allows a MitM attack. While 3G AKA
can be used in GSM if supported by all parties, no downgrade
prevention exists [143].
Although the fact of non-existing mutual authentication
originally exploits a specific vulnerability of GSM networks,
they are still a relevant threat in today’s networks as the
weakest-link-principle applies. Downgrade attacks via un-
secured pre-authentication traffic on UMTS or LTE (Sec-
tion V-A) still allow to exploit this GSM vulnerability on
modern phones. The difference to pre-authentication traffic
(Section V-A) is the lack of mutual authentication. In that
sense, the non-existing mutual authentication is an extension
of the unsecured pre-authentication traffic issue and has sim-
ilarities in attacks and defenses with the former cause.
1) Attacks: If the phone cannot verify the authenticity of
the network, an unconditional trust of the phone to the network
and, thus, to a potential attacker is established. In a network-
centric architecture, where most decisions are made by the
network, an attacker faking a base station gains excessive
power over the handset.
Fake base stations often employ additional techniques to
keep a victim in the fake cell, such as not supplying infor-
mation on neighboring cells or manipulating cell reselection
thresholds [64]. The phone behaves inconspicuously and is
able to make phone calls as well as send text messages
and data to the fake network. However, without any fur-
ther exploit, the attacker can not gain the possession of the
cryptographic keys. Still, the attacker can downgrade the
communication to the null-cipher or an easily attackable cipher
(see Section V-C1a) for passing it to the real network. In this
case, the phone remains reachable for the genuine network.
Alternatively, calls, SMS, and data could be forwarded with
additional modems or SIP, in which case the original caller-ID
is lost, and the phone is not reachable from the outside. The
impact of the attacks can be increased by an attacker with SS7
capabilities, e. g., she/he can directly inject the traffic into the
phone network.
Similar to measurement reports on LTE, the GSM radio
resource location service protocol enables the network to
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request GPS coordinates from the phone [144]. Developed
for emergency services, most phones will answer the request
even though it is not an emergency call [63]. Additionally,
the non-existing mutual authentication has been a rich source
for location-based SMS spam—mainly in China [92], [145].
Commercially available fake base stations with ready-to-use
exploits are a reminder of the urgency with which this threat
should be addressed.
2) Defenses: Similar to unsecured pre-authentication traf-
fic, fake base stations that exploit the non-existing mutual
authentication can be detected with mobile apps, baseband
firewalls, sensors, or network-based sensors [64], [65], [66],
[67], [68], [69], [110]. Nevertheless, mobile apps do not suf-
ficiently protect against the threat of fake base stations [111].
Besides that, fake base stations that send out SMS spam
can be detected based on the content of the SMS and
meta-information (e. g., signal strength, duration of cell con-
tact) [92]. Many defenses (and caveats) from unsecured pre-
authentication (Section V-A2) traffic also apply here.
While UMTS and later network generations introduced
mutual authentication, the literature urges retrofitting mutual
authentication to GSM. Some of the proposed schemes need
major changes in the specification [117], [118], while others
focus on minimizing changes to ensure a fast roll-out [119],
[120]. Different proposals for UMTS authentication schemes
over GSM exist [121], [122], but the current used one does
neither protect against downgrades nor integrity-protect the Ci-
pherModeCommand. Thus, giving an MitM-attacker attacker
the ability to choose a weak or no cipher.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: Even the phase-
out of GSM by some network providers does not protect users
against MitM attacks, as the phone continues to “speak” GSM.
Research can thus proceed into several directions. Modern
authentication protocols could be retrofitted into GSM with a
downgrade protection that prohibits legacy GSM operations if
both the phone and the network can support newer methods. A
downgrade protection scheme will also benefit future network
generations with their security problems. For this, we refer
to the causes unsecured pre-authentication traffic and wireless
channel, as they are responsible for downgrade attacks.
Summary: GSM has no network authentication, which
leads to privacy and confidentiality issues. Neverthe-
less, the GSM specification will not be addressed by
any improvements. For future generations downgrade
attacks to the insecure GSM standard open old attack
vectors. Future research must suggest technologies for
prevention downgrade attacks, e. g., by securing the pre-
authentication traffic. Furthermore, the retrofitting net-
work authentication to GSM provides protection in case
of a downgrade attack.
C. Cause: Weak Cryptography
Cryptography provides the means to achieve data confiden-
tiality. However, weak cryptography can lead to attacks reveal-
ing protected information. This can emerge from intentionally
weakened algorithms or by evolving attack methods [146].
Cryptographic systems should be designed following Kerck-
hoffs’ principle [147], which states that a system should only
rely on the secrecy of the key, while everything else might
be known to the attacker (or the public). In the following, we
describe attacks that aim specifically at weak cryptography.
1) Attacks: Cryptography is used for the encryption algo-
rithms on the air interface, for the handover, and initial key
derivation. In all these parts, we identify attacks due to the
use of weak cryptography. The found attacks undermine the
data confidentially requirement, either by breaking the used
session key or the shared key on the SIM card.
a) Encryption Algorithms: Table IV depicts the air
interface encryption algorithms for all three generations, in
particular the type of cipher, the effective key length, and
if the cipher is attackable. All cipher suites in GSM except
for A5/{3,4} are breakable within minutes on commodity
hardware for different reasons. A5/1 is a 64-bit cipher based on
three connected Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR) with
major cryptographic vulnerabilities that have led to passive
decryption attacks [75], [76], [77], [78], [79], [80]. A5/2 was
designed as a stripped-down export version of A5/1 with a
shorter effective key length, and Goldberg et al. [148] showed
how to break this cipher in near real-time. Rainbow table
approaches are further eased by the predictable padding of
messages [81]. Theoretical attacks exist against KASUMI but
they are impractical in terms of space requirements, as they
require 226 captured data frames [149] and do not directly
translate into A5/3. A5/3 rainbow tables similar to A5/1 were
proposed but never published [150]. GPRS ciphers GEAx
basically mirror the weaknesses and development of their
A5/x counterparts [151]. In GSM, the cipher-capabilities of
the network and the user device are not integrity-protected
and are therefore vulnerable to manipulation. An attacker can




Cipher Type Effective (nom.)key length Attackable
2G A5/0 Null Cipher –  
A5/1 + Comp128v1/2 LFSR-based 54 (64) bits  
A5/1 + Comp128v3 LFSR-based 64 bits  
A5/2 LFSR-based 40 (64) bits  
A5/3 KASUMI 64 bits G#
A5/4 KASUMI 128 bits #
GEA1 LFSR-based 64 bits  
GEA2 LFSR-based 64 bits  
GEA3 KASUMI 64 bits G#
GEA4 KASUMI 128 bits #
3G UEA0 Null Cipher –  
UEA1 KASUMI 128 bits #
UEA2 SNOW 3G 128 bits #
4G EEA0 Null Cipher –  
EEA1 SNOW 3G 128 bits #
EEA2 AES 128 bits #
EEA3 ZUC 128 bits #
# not attackable  attacks with commodity hardware knownG# attacks known, but not practicable or not demonstrated
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In contrast to GSM, all UMTS and LTE ciphers underwent
public development and thus followed Kerckhoffs’ principle.
As a consequence, only one attack against the KASUMI
based UEA1 algorithm was revealed, but still requires an
unpractically large amount of captured data [152], [153].
Additionally, each generation has a null cipher that offers no
protection. Since the networks select the encryption algorithm,
the user is unaware of sending data in clear text. A ciphering
indicator should warn the user on the UE. However, just few
vendors implement such a ciphering indicator [62], [154],
[155], [156].
b) Interoperability of Access Technologies: Interesting
problems arise due the usage of same key material within
the same generation or due to the interconnection of network
generations. Barkan et al. [75] describe that it is possible
to downgrade to a less secure cipher for a short period of
time or to reconstruct the key passively from over-the-air
communication and later use it for all the other (secure)
ciphers. In order to allow a GSM SIM to connect to UMTS,
the key is extended to meet the UMTS key length [73], [143],
[157]. Also, a USIM operating on GSM will simply use a
shortened key. Thus, an attack on the much weaker A5/x
series reveals parts of the key information for other access
technologies during handover. Additionally, the LTE handover
is vulnerable to the so-called “desynchronization” attack [74].
As shown in simulations, an attacker can desynchronize the
used key with the core network and, thus, an old session key
is reused.
c) Key Derivation: Weak cryptography is also used for
the initial key derivation algorithms. By reverse-engineering
and breaking the COMP128v1 key derivation algorithm of
GSM an attacker can reconstruct the shared secret key [70],
[71]. In combination with side-channels of some poorly pro-
tected implementations, COMP128v1 attacks can be brought
down to nearly instant key recovery [72] (see Section VI-B).
Another attack by Nohl et al. [85] on SIM cards can re-
motely reconstruct the SIM’s software update key based on
weak DES encryption or poorly implemented 3DES (proper
implementations are safe). They leveraged the fact that the
error messages concerning ciphering are sent encrypted with
a known plaintext. As this attack is delivered via SMS, there
are no proximity limitations to the attacker. A reconstructed
OTA key enables the attacker to install new applications on
the SIM card, subsequently accessing secrets stored in other
applications (see Section VI-A).
Assessment: All the attacks based on weak cryptography
primarily undermine the data confidentially aim of mobile
networks. The attacker might also pursue a secondary aim.
For example, the shared key obtained through SIM attacks
can later be used to decode encrypted transmissions or write
the keys on a freely programmable SIM card. Such cards can
be used to impersonate a subscriber, redirect calls, change
settings, or commit fee fraud. While attacks on the air interface
can be executed by an attacker with passive radio capabilities,
the attacks on the SIM card require physical access— thereby
are thereby either limited to the radio transmission range or
to the physical range. The attacks on the session keys are
possible using affordable methods such as rainbow tables on
an ordinary PC. GSM is especially prone to cryptography at-
tacks. In contrast, newer generations rely on secure algorithms
following the Kerckhoffs’ principle such that these attacks are
not known for now.
2) Defenses: Because the specification follows the best
practices in newer generations, most of the defenses con-
centrate on the weaknesses of GSM. After weaknesses of
A5/{1,2} became apparent and attacks were feasible, two
new ciphers were added which are backports of the UMTS
KASUMI cipher, whereas A5/3 simply pads the GSM 64-bit
key to 128 bits and A5/4 uses the full 128 bits [158]. The
A5/3 usage is increasing [65], but as of 2017, there is no
known network supporting A5/4. GSMA finally mandated the
removal of A5/2 support from phones [125]. Besides A5/2,
the A5/0 was a useful downgrade target, so some networks
disabled both of them [65]. Disabling A5/1 is still not a viable
option for operators.
The key derivations and authentication algorithms are ex-
changeable and also follow the best practice. MILENAGE is
based on AES and replaces COMP128 [159]. TUAK, based
on SHA-3 (Keccak), is another option for the authentication
[160]. It is important the algorithms is provably secure and
hold strong security assumptions [123].
The introduction of new encryption algorithms for old ac-
cess technologies decreases the effectiveness of attacks. How-
ever, this introduction takes a long time as software/hardware
needs to be updated and new algorithms must be specified.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: Standardization
and implementation of cryptographic protocols for handover,
initial key derivation, or encryption did not follow best prac-
tices at all times for various reasons [146]. Advances in
cryptanalysis have revealed various vulnerabilities in these
algorithms. In the future, new algorithms need to be carefully
analyzed following Kerckhoffs’ principle. Furthermore, as
advances in cryptanalysis and computational power need to be
factored in, provisions for possible updates of security-relevant
algorithms must be build into standards while simultaneously
employing anti-downgrade methods in case old and new
methods or key lengths need to coexist.
This is especially the case for the newly introduced device-
to-device (D2D) communication. In the case of direct device
communication, two devices agree on a common key by using
two protocols that provide no forward secrecy and rely on one
master key [161], [162], [163]. Such a scheme has different
security implications [164]. If asymmetric cryptography is
added to 5G or future generation, this might introduce new
attack surfaces if not designed and implemented carefully.
Additionally, the to-be-introduced embedded SIM card comes
with a complex security infrastructure and with protocols that
have not yet been analyzed with respect to security [165]. A
vulnerability in the draft of the 5G AKA allowing an attacker
to impersonate a victim to the network has been found with
a formal symbolic analysis [166]. The latter example shows
that new security schemes must be carefully analyzed. Future
research should prove the security of all the used cryptographic
techniques in the mobile context to ensure overall security.
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Summary: Weak cryptography has led to many attacks
against the data confidentiality aim. In future generations,
structural changes such as device-to-device communica-
tion challenge the use of secure algorithms. The system’s
security should continue to rely on well-known and
proven secure cryptographic algorithms. Future research
must match specified cryptographic algorithms with a
realistic scope of attacker capabilities. Additionally, mea-
sures to protect against downgrade attacks to older and
less secure ciphers and protocols must be developed.
D. Cause: Insecure Inter-Network Protocols
Nowadays the telecommunication industry is deregulated
and SS7 has been ported to an IP-based network. Both
developments make SS7 easily accessible. Thus, an attacker
with SS7 capabilities becomes more likely. However, for
interconnectivity with the SS7 networks, SS7 messages are
translated to Diameter. This makes Diameter also vulnerable
to SS7 attacks, as this inter-working function does not provide
authenticity. Even though Diameter was designed with security
features based on protocols like TLS and IPsec, researchers
found vulnerabilities in the dedicated Diameter protocol that
do not rest upon the inter-working function of SS7.
1) Attacks: The general idea of SS7 attacks is to request
services on different layers of the home network or the serving
network. As SS7 offers no authentication mechanisms, the
network entities cannot decide if the request is legitimate.
Thus, the entity replies properly, even though the request might
not be legitimate.
An attacker can determine the user location on different
levels of granularity—in the range of cells up to exact GPS
coordinates [56], [167], [168]. Additionally, an attacker can
map the temporary identity (TMSI) to the permanent identity
(IMSI) of a victim by using the SS7 system. The permanent
identity can then be mapped to the public telephone number.
Both attacks are not compliant with the identity confidentiality
aim. The misuse of SS7 can also lead to attacks that undermine
the confidentiality of calls or of text messages [56]. This
can be done by rerouting calls or by requesting the over-the-
air encryption key. Besides this, the insecurity of SS7 can
also be exploited for fraud attacks by unblocking a stolen
device [100]. Additionally, an attacker can run a precise DoS
attack against a distinct user by deleting subscriber data in
the VLR [56]. Attacks that are possible due to the inter-
working function between Diameter and SS7 are discussed
by Holtmanns et al. [168] and Rao et al. [169]. Even Diam-
eter has been found vulnerable and allows to intercept text
messages [170].
Assessment: The insecurity of SS7 leads to a wide range
of attacks. Most of them aim to undermine the (location)
privacy of the user. Even commercial services were built upon
the insecurity of SS7 allowing to pinpoint and track a victim
[34], [56], [171]. This shows that the SS7 vulnerabilities are
actively used and are thereby a serious threat to users. Most of
the attacks require SS7 capabilities of the attacker. However,
some attacks can be accomplished by using passive radio
capabilities, e. g., an attacker can decrypt the traffic as soon
as the over-the-air encryption key is revealed.
2) Defenses: The most sustainable long-term solution is
the complete elimination of SS7. With the specification of
Diameter in LTE, a more secure protocol is used for inter-
networking functions. However, even Diameter is not free of
flaws [169], [170]. Additionally, the inter-working function
between SS7 and Diameter still allows attacks via Diameter
based on SS7 vulnerabilities, as long as not all the network
providers migrate to Diameter.
Therefore, short-term solutions to mitigate the threats of
SS7 and Diameter insecurity have been proposed. Most of
them are based on validating the legitimacy of the request
and then blocking the request itself or blacklisting certain
classes of message types. For example, a request for the
over-the-air encryption key is only allowed by a network that
proves the user’s registration within its range. Furthermore,
certain requests are merely of network-internal interest and
are discarded at the network border, e. g., the charging of
the prepaid credit. The industry provides solutions for the
mobile network operators ranging from SS7 scans [127],
[172] to stateful SS7 firewalls [128], [129]. Peeters et al.
suggest a detection mechanism of intercepted phone calls by
an SS7 redirection attack using distance bounding and timing
information [173].
3) Research Questions and Challenges: By now, it is
known that SS7 is an insecure protocol and the backward-
compatibility of Diameter rendering also newer systems vul-
nerable to SS7 attacks. The exclusive use of Diameter in the
(inter)-core network communication would be a step forward
in terms of security, but it will not entirely solve the security
problems.
Thus, the open research question is to design a protocol
that is proven secure and that holds the security requirements,
especially the privacy requirements in the (inter)-core network
while maintaining the functionality of the mobility manage-
ment. Such a protocol must withstand an exhaustive security
analysis. For example, such a protocol should enforce a proof
from the remote network that the subscriber is actually present
and only authorize such transactions. A solution explored for
5G is to bind keys to a public key identity of the serving
network [101, §5.2.4.6]. Both would prevent attacks in which
an attacker sends unauthorized requests to the home network,
e. g., for the session key. The means of a privacy-preserving
protocol are open topics for research.
Summary: Insecure inter-network protocols (e. g., SS7)
allow privacy and fraud attacks, and will not be entirely
switched off in the near future. Firewalls constitute only
temporary solutions to the problem. Future research is
challenged to design privacy-preserving inter-network
protocols that keep the maintenance overhead low.
E. Cause: Resource Usage Asymmetry
Resource usage asymmetry occurs when an simple action
on one side triggers a computationally or resource-wise ex-
pensive reaction on the other side. This—for example—leads
to signaling DoS attacks, during which an attacker misuses
signaling/control messages to trigger an expensive action.
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Thus, the network allocates the resources within different
components and may eventually run out of them after repeated
or coordinated requests.
1) Attacks: Unauthenticated messages like those used in
the attach procedure can be utilized to overload the core
network components [40], [43]. Additionally, they can imper-
sonate legitimate subscribers. Similarly, Lee et al. [39] have
presented signaling attacks for 3G networks and argue that
low-volume but well-timed signaling attacks can have a major
impact on the network components. By misusing multiple
messages for establishment and release of radio connections,
the authors caused a significant increase of message load in
the network. Traynor et al. [55] evaluated network attacks
targeting the HLR2G,3G. They found an effective method to
tear down an HLR by frequently switching the call forwarding
service on and off. They suggest that a mobile phone botnet
can disable the service of an HLR.
Similarly, a mobile phone botnet could attack a 911 re-
sponse center, which would result in an outage of emergency
services [174]. While this is not exclusively related to mobile-
phone networks, the elevated priority of emergency calls
makes it a unique mobile network problem: The network
will drop other connections in favor of emergency calls if
necessary. Enck et al. [52] evaluated attacks considering the
to open SMS functionality on the Internet. They analyze an
attacker model that uses open SMS centers on the Internet to
saturate the wireless link downstream from the base stations,
obstructing the service in the whole cell.
Assessment: All the attacks based on resource usage
asymmetry focus on an exhaustive denial-of-service of the
network. However, the impact of these attacks vary. While
some attacks require active radio attacker capabilities, others
already work with Internet capabilities. Besides intentional
disturbance of the service, similar problems can occur due to
misconfigured mobile apps or unexpected user behavior [175],
[176].
2) Defenses: So far, most suggested detection and pro-
tection methods are statistical approaches [39], [53], [55].
Random connection drops might protect the network func-
tionality as a whole, but inevitably they also deny legitimate
requests. Even good statistical methods come with a non-
negligible false-positive rate. The suggested protocol changes
are unrealistic for currently rolled out networks.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: All the defenses
suggest reactive schemes that come with a certain false-
positive rate and do not prevent attacks. Future research should
explore how to prevent resource exhaustion in the first place.
This could require protocol changes and is, thus, only viable
for new network generations.
Possible approaches can be borrowed from similar problems
in the context of other computer networks. RFC5013 [177]
proposes a TCP cookie against connection flood attacks. In
contrast, Dwork [178] and Back [179] suggested a proof-of-
work-based method against flooding and email spam. Before
the server or network processes a request, the client has to
solve a (moderately hard) computational puzzle, proving its
commitment. These puzzles have to be easy to generate, easy
to check, but parametrizable hard to solve (e. g., finding bits
of a hash-collision). Thus, equalizing the computational load
on both sides and making flood-based DoS attacks much
more resource-intense for the attacker. However, such schemes
have to be adopted to and evaluated in the context of mobile
networks. Challenges include the limited resources on mobile
devices and low-latency requirements on some operations.
Summary: Resource usage asymmetry allows to flood
networks with signaling messages and eventually a denial
of service. Future research must aim for complete attack
prevention, as current state of the art research can only
provide probabilistic detection. This is possible through
protocol designs with balanced resource usage.
VI. ROOT CAUSE: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUE
Deviations of the implementation from the original specifi-
cation can open attack vectors and, thus, can have a security
impact on otherwise securely defined systems. Such deviations
can be introduced on purpose, e. g., for compatibility trade-
offs, or result from faulty implementations. In the following,
we discuss the implications of insecure and leaky implemen-
tations.
A. Cause: Insecure Implementation
While insecure implementations can open attack vectors in
deployed systems, current research mainly focuses on attacks
on the baseband and SIM cards. By sending malicious data to
vulnerable devices, an adversary can exploit implementation
issues. In the following, we discuss how attacks undermine the
system integrity, availability, secrecy, and privacy including
potential countermeasures.
1) Attacks: The lower layers of the protocol stack run on
distinct baseband processors in the UE. Parser errors within the
baseband processor can occur due to faulty implementations of
parsing modules or libraries threatening the device’s integrity.
In 2016, a heap overflow in a widely used ASN.1 compiler was
discovered [87], [180] affecting baseband implementations
of multiple manufacturers. Weinmann [88] and Golde [11]
demonstrated how to use baseband exploits to further target
the application processor and its operating system.
Crashing-only flaws in the parsing and decoding stage of
text messages [89], [90], [91] make the phone inoperable until
the next reboot. Similar flaws on SMS parsing have been found
on other processing levels [181].
Apart from attacks on the baseband, Nohl et al. [85] showed
that the application isolation on the SIM card is so weak
that processes can access foreign data including authentica-
tion credentials. Such applications can be remotely installed
after reconstructing the over-the-air (OTA) update key (see
Section V-C1c).
Implementation flaws in the protocol state machines of the
baseband result in the acceptance of a fake base station as a
genuine network endangering data secrecy and privacy [60],
[61], [62], [63].
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Assessment: On the one hand, we see that attacks can be
launched globally and in a targeted manner that makes the
impact of these flaws very high. On the other hand, the most
dangerous ASN.1 heap overflow and the staged baseband-
to-application-processor attacks required a fake base station
with active radio capabilities and is thus locally bounded. The
danger lies in the potential to take over the device at the lowest
level.
2) Defenses: Intermediate workarounds for multiple of the
aforementioned attacks are based on operator-side filtering.
For example, operators filter out messages that might be used
to infer the OTA-key of SIM cards. Such filtering can be easily
and quickly deployed by the operator. However, intermediate
workarounds are typically only effective against known attacks
and, thus, are not very sustainable. Furthermore, network
filtering only prevents attacks coming through the network. An
attacker with active radio capabilities operating a fake base
station can still deliver these exploits directly to the phone,
albeit with reduced range.
More generic defenses in the field of insecure implemen-
tation focus on the detection and prevention of insecure
implementations. For SMS parsing errors as well as for state
machine errors, various security testing frameworks have been
proposed [61], [62], [89], [90]. These frameworks automati-
cally test for known vulnerability patterns based on predefined
test cases. While automated approaches were used to find SMS
parsing errors and state machine errors, many memory cor-
ruption vulnerabilities were manually found through reverse
engineering [11], [88].
3) Research Questions and Challenges: All the attacks
and mitigations stemming from insecure implementation have
similarities to classic system security. We distinguish research
questions between detection and prevention of vulnerabilities.
Additionally, we discuss the shortcomings of the existing work
which is the current scope.
a) Detection of Vulnerabilities: Although testing frame-
works have been proposed [61], [62], [89], [90], they usually
focus on one particular type of flaw, such as SMS parsing
errors, state machine failures, or particular memory vulnera-
bilities. Basebands have complex state machines and exhibit
a fragile behavior [11], thus, automated testing tools based on
fuzz testing have problems achieving higher levels of code and
state coverage. However, alternatives such as manual reverse
engineering of the baseband scale poorly and are expensive.
Therefore, reliable detection methods for vulnerabilities in
the decoding functions and state machines are needed. The
decoding functions are important to protect against integrity
and availability attacks. This can be supported by data for
security testing that would allow better corner case testing,
e. g., error states and illegal state machine transitions.
b) Prevention of Vulnerabilities: Control-flow hijack-
ing, memory corruption, and state machine failures are well-
known problems in the context of classic system secu-
rity [131], [132], [133]. However, in mobile security, classic
system security defenses face certain challenges. Most notably,
the real-time capability is a hard requirement for the baseband,
as it needs to stay synchronized with the radio transmissions.
In addition to the run-time overhead, many modern counter-
measures come with a certain overhead, unreasonable for the
baseband. Adapting classic system security countermeasures
like memory-safe languages, memory address randomization,
or control-flow integrity solutions in this constrained environ-
ment remain an open challenge [131], [132], [133].
Another way to reduce implementation bugs is to carefully
choose the development framework based on their intrin-
sic security properties [182], [183]. Additionally, machine-
readable protocol specifications and state machines would
allow to generate parsers and state machines directly from the
specification, cutting out the error-prone human interpretation
of the specification. For parsing, part of the 3GPP specification
already employs ASN.1. However, the parser libraries and
compilers must be thoroughly tested and audited to avoid the
fallout an ASN.1 compiler bug caused in 2016 [87], [180].
c) Current Scope: Within implementation security, the
research community focuses mainly on the user equipment.
However, it is very likely that other network components, e. g.,
the core network or base stations, suffer from similar vulner-
abilities. For example, ASN.1 parsing is also implemented on
the network side. Thus, it is not unlikely that the known ASN.1
vulnerabilities may also be present in network components. We
therefore suggest the examination of network components as
well.
Summary: Insecure implementations open attack vectors
for adversaries with active radio capabilities or direct
network access. Future research must provide more sus-
tainable defenses of the classical system security context,
e. g., control-flow integrity protection for basebands.
B. Cause: Leaky Implementation
Implementations in software and hardware can leak infor-
mation about internal states in surprising or non-obvious ways.
Besides using a provable secure, an implementation might leak
enough information to circumvent the strong security measures
due to the implementation insufficiencies.
1) Attacks: The SIM card stores the secret key for authen-
tication and key derivation. Gaining access to this information
breaks the security concept at its very core enabling decryption
and impersonation.
Rao et al. [57] and Zhou et al. [58] have built a key
reconstruction attack upon the cryptanalysis of Comp128v1
on Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) SIM
cards with chosen plaintexts and by using electromagnetic
field probes. In 2015, Liu et al. [59] found that the AES-
based MILENAGE algorithm on USIM implementations is
susceptible to power-based side-channel analysis and were
thus able to extract the secret key.
Assessment: The primary aim of such attacks is gaining
access to the secret key and, thereby, undermining the con-
fidentially requirement. However, once the key is known to
the attacker, he/she might fulfill secondary attack aims. It
may enable him/her to decrypt the radio communication with
passive radio capabilities or to impersonate a subscriber by
cloning the SIM card.
Even though the aforementioned attacks reveal one of the
most valuable secrets in mobile networks, the attacks require
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temporary physical access to the SIM card. Thus, forging
SIM card clones is more likely to happen through an internal
attacker or through the device owners themselves than through
external attackers.
2) Defenses: The proposed defenses for side-channel at-
tacks are implementation-specific [57], [58], [59]. The com-
mon ground for all known defenses is to have constant time
and power properties, thus not leaking information about the
internal state and making it unfeasible to derive the secret key
by non-invasive methods.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: The proposed
countermeasures need to be adopted to SIM cards by the
industry. Clear requirements for constant time and constant
power properties in the specification would help to accelerate
the process of adoption. Additionally, it could be helpful to
require a third party certification regarding attack resistance. If
asymmetric cryptography should make it into 5G USIMs, than
this will pose additional challenges to side-channel prevention
[101, §5.1.4.19].
An upcoming technology in the field of SIM cards is the
embedded SIM card [165]. Embedded SIM cards enable the
configuration of the users’ credentials via the Internet and are
permanently soldered into the user device. From a research
perspective it is interesting to examine how embedded SIM
cards are secured against side-channel attacks.
Summary: Leaky implementations reveal the secret key
of the SIM card via unintended side-channel attacks. With
the leaked key, an attacker can passively decrypt the
communication or impersonate a victim. Future research
needs to investigate new technologies with respect to
their side-channel resistance, e. g., embedded SIM cards
or asymmetric cryptography implemented on SIM cards.
VII. ROOT CAUSE: PROTOCOL CONTEXT DISCREPANCY
This root cause is based on protocol context issues that are
due to deploying a protocol that is not originally intended for
the mobile network environment. Protocol properties are not
harmful in a non-mobile network environment, but may be
exploitable in a mobile environment if not adjusted properly.
A. Cause: Cross-Layer Information Loss
The layering of network stacks serves multiple important
purposes such as implementation transparency (e. g., upper
layers do not have to care about details of lower layers)
and interoperability (e. g., upper layer applications can span
or exchange data over multiple networks). However, such
layering also means loss of information that might be needed at
higher levels, e. g., at some point, IP addresses or connections
need to be mapped to the subscriber identity.
1) Attacks: The lack of a strong binding between radio-
level authentication and IP-service authentication is the source
for multiple vulnerabilities. The literature show that the im-
plementation of such mapping is vulnerable and can be
tricked with simple IP-based attacks, such as spoofing of IP
addresses [28], [99]. IP address spoofing can be exploited for
over- and under-billing attacks and to reverse the isolation
of the internals to the Internet network. IPv4 and IPv6 NAT
middleboxes pose a threat to the users as well as for the
mobile network operator [41], [51]. Similarly to the NAT
middleboxes, the Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW) root-
ing configuration seems to be a problem in cases that allow
direct communication between two phones [97], [98]. Another
related problem is the lack of security checks within the SIP-
protocol. Manipulated SIP headers can be used to fake the
caller ID with UE-originated SMS messages [94].
Assessment: All these attacks consider an attacker able to
initiate user traffic and optional Internet traffic capabilities.
Hence, all the attacks can be easily realized. The range
of those attacks is network-wide, thus an attacker can be
anywhere in the network and exploit the flaw. We see the trend
that newer generations—especially LTE—are more prone to
attacks that are based on cross-layer information loss. This
happens because LTE aims to be a general-purpose network
providing normal Internet connectivity, and the layering of
stacks is more prominent in those networks.
2) Defenses: Higher-level services cannot solely rely on
the transport layer security measures of the lower layers
and their authentication. Since an attacker can access any
network communication on the device, no data from the
device should be trusted. A secure binding between the user’s
charging ID and the established connection suppresses any
possible misuse [28]. Such a secure binding operates across
the separated layers. Additionally, Peng et al. suggest active
de-authorization of a connection and a feedback-based mis-
charge correction scheme for misbilling attacks [28]. Other
mitigations built upon well-configured and maintained stateful
firewalls to encounter threats due to misconfigured routers and
NAT middleboxes [41], [51], [97], [98]. All defenses must be
implemented at the core network by operator. While firewalls
and the secure binding can by simply implemented, more
advanced misbilling countermeasures, e. g., deauthorization or
feedback-based mischarge correction need to be specified.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: The research
question is, how protocols that were not originally designed
for the use in mobile networks can be adapted in such a way
that they prevent possible information loss across layers. For
instance, instead of making it a duty of the higher service
to connect the IP identity with the radio identity, some part
of the core network could inject the radio identity into the
IP stream. For all the countermeasures, it is important that
no data from the user should be trusted, as it could be
forged. However, such extensions must be carefully evaluated
with respect to sustainability and performance. Additionally,
currently discussed 5G additions such as software-defined
networking and network virtualization, can introduce new
ways for cross-layer information loss. Future research should
evaluate whether new protocols introduce information losses.
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Summary: Cross-layer information loss causes fraud or
DoS attacks and is especially exploitable within newer
generations. Countermeasures propose a secure binding
between the separated network layers and firewalls. Fu-
ture research must carefully observe new technological
proposals, e. g., 5G network virtualization to avoid cross-
layer information loss in the future generations to come.
B. Cause: Accounting Policy Inconsistency
Mobile networks come with a variety of billing methods.
Some services are charged by time and geographical distance,
others by data volume. In earlier networks, the different billing
methods were straightforward to distinguish as they were
based on different network services. However, data networks
—such as the Internet—were originally not in mind when
earlier networks were built. Another problem are transmission
artifacts that occur on lower layers without the knowledge
or control of higher layers, such as data retransmissions
because of bad connectivity or packet loss. For example,
some providers charge for TCP retransmissions while others
do not. In addition, some providers have special charging
policies for extra services such as music streaming. These
policy inconsistencies lead to hidden channels that can be
exploited for billing attacks (fraud attacks).
1) Attacks: Hidden channels for different protocols have
been found, e. g., in the DNS protocol [184] or in TCP re-
transmissions [95], [96], both leading to under billing attacks.
Additionally, TCP retransmission can also be exploited for
over-billing attacks [95]. In this case, the attacker uses an
existing connection to send unwanted TCP retransmissions to
increase the victim’s data usage. With the shift from the circuit
voice to a packet-based voice switching, VoLTE introduced a
new attack surface for under-billing attacks using the RTP and
the SIP protocol [97], [98]. As voice is traditionally charged
according to call duration, the voice-related channels can be
misused as a hidden channel to transport data and thereby
circumvent the accounting mechanism.
Assessment: Most hidden channels are still exploited by
an attacker with user traffic capabilities and optional Internet
capabilities. Similar to the cross-layer information loss, these
attacks are exploitable in the latest network generations and
can be exploited everywhere in the network.
2) Defenses: To encounter the threat of accounting pol-
icy inconsistency, most countermeasures suggest the use of
improved filtering at the gateway to detect possible misuses
based on technologies like deep packet inspection, stateful
protocol monitoring or ratio detection (of DNS packets or TCP
retransmission) [95], [97], [98], [184]. These countermeasures
need to be installed by the operators in the core network at
the packet gateways to protect against revenue losses.
3) Research Questions and Challenges: In the future,
more applications will utilize the IP connectivity for their
service instead of using the special purpose services such as
text messages and voice. These special purpose services orig-
inally generated a large proportion of the operators revenue.
To encounter revenue losses, operators have established new
accounting policies, e. g., fixed rates for music or video stream-
ing [185], [186]. Future research should evaluate how such
new accounting policies lead to inconsistency and thus open
hidden channels for billing attacks. Effective countermeasures
against these hidden channels and thus a prevention of billing
attacks are remaining challenges.
Summary: Inconsistent accounting policies open up the
possibility for hidden channels, which allow to consume
resources without being charged for the service. Future
research must exclude the possibility for hidden channels
by an early detection of conspicuous behavior, e. g.,
through anomaly detection.
VIII. ROOT CAUSE: WIRELESS CHANNEL
The wireless channel is essential for realizing mobility in
mobile networks. However, this versatility makes the channel
also easily accessible by unauthorized persons within the range
of the radio transmission. Additionally, the wireless channel
has limited resources. Over time more effective modulations
and transmission schemes have been developed to improve the
wireless transmission performance by reducing transmission
redundancies. The easy access to the wireless channel makes
mobile networks prone to jamming attacks for which an
attacker disturbs the communication between two parties in a
targeted manner. Jamming attacks are DoS attacks and require
an active radio attacker. As a result, the wireless channel is
prone to several attacks and exhibits fundamental limitations
such that we define it as a root cause.
A. Attacks
Jamming attacks disturb the communication by increasing
the noise on the wireless channel. Most prior research has
concentrated on the evaluation of different constant jamming
strategies and their effectiveness [47], [48], [49], [187], [188].
While constant jamming attacks jam the entire communication
bandwidth over time, smart jamming attacks are protocol-
aware and intentionally jam certain control information that
affect the rest of the communication. In general, smart jam-
ming attacks are more cost-efficient. Lichtman et al. [46], [50],
[189] demonstrated that LTE is particularly vulnerable to smart
jamming.
Assessment: All jamming attacks require an active radio
attacker who needs to be aware of the used frequencies and the
bandwidth. For smart jamming attacks, the attacker requires
knowledge of the protocol and needs to be synchronized
with the cell to obtain the position of control information.
Nevertheless, the hardware for such attacks is easily avail-
able [190], [191], in particular in the form of software defined
radios such as USRPs [192]. While jamming attacks disturb
the communication of all the victims, smart jamming attacks
are more targeted. In all cases, the effective range of the
attack is limited by the transmission power and location of
the jammer. The motivation for jamming attacks is versatile.
Besides simply obstructing the mobile service [193], jamming
attacks can also serve as downgrade attacks.
B. Defenses
Different countermeasures against jamming have been pro-
posed by the research community ranging from specification
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changes to smart implementations using different technologies,
e. g., beamforming or spread-spectrum techniques [134]. So
far, little effort has been devoted to implement or to evaluate
jamming countermeasures in mobile networks. Furthermore,
it is little known about jamming countermeasure implementa-
tions within commercial products and their deployment.
C. Research Questions and Challenges
Even though different defenses are proposed, none of them
have been evaluated in detail for mobile networks. Such mea-
sures could negatively impact the transmission speed which
is an important selling point for future network generations.
Future research should explore the methods that were proposed
or adopted by related fields [194], [195] and evaluate their
fit and benefits to mobile network setups. The challenge
is to integrate efficiently jamming countermeasures which
typically linked to performance impairments, into the radio
layer, still fulfilling quality of service requirements. This can
be achieved by a specification that is dedicated for the use
in critical networks with efficiency loss. Additional research
should also consider new radio technologies like the narrow-
band LTE [196]. Hardening new generations against jamming
attacks is especially important for the availability of safety-
critical applications.
Summary: The wireless channel is open and easily
accessible and, thus, can be exploited by jamming at-
tacks. As a consequence, the adversary can impact the
availability of services. So far, no strong defenses exist.
Future research is challenged by the trade-off between
efficient jamming countermeasures and high data rates to
ensure the availability of safety-critical applications.
IX. RELATED SURVEYS
We finally compare our work to related surveys from a
methodological perspective highlighting parallels and differ-
ences.
Different survey papers study a wide range of aspects of
next-generation mobile networks (5G). For example, an overall
survey of the performance requirements and solutions for 5G
networks is given by Agiwal et al. [197]. Whereas Taleb et al.
focus on the particular use case of mobile edge computing in
5G networks [198]. These surveys lack the focus on security
in the field of next generations mobile networks.
Security surveys in (mobile) phone networks focus either on
one particular aspect of the system or consider just one type
of attack. For example, Unger et al. [12] focus on messaging
systems and compare them based on desired security features
and usability aspects. In contrast to our work, their method-
ology does not include attacks. Tu et al. [15] directly map
telephone spam attacks and their countermeasures, without
an abstraction into causes and root causes. Acer et al. [13]
identify research issues in the area of Android security and use
a methodology that directly addresses the stakeholders who
might fix the issues. Our approach has the most similarities
with the recently published work by Sahin et al. [17] since
they also categorize attacks and defenses into causes and root
causes. However, they limit their considerations to telephony
fraud. Unique to our approach is that we abstract attacks and
defenses into causes and root causes for all the three mobile
network generations and use this approach to derive research
questions for future generations of mobile networks.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduced a systematization methodology
for attacks and defenses in mobile networks. We derived
technical causes and abstract root causes for existing vulner-
abilities and discussed the impacts of attacks and defenses.
We used this to derive challenges and research questions
with respect to shortcomings of existing work and security
implications for new 5G technologies. The results of our
systematization have implications on future security research
in mobile networks. We finally point to the major areas and
challenges for future research on this topic.
Vulnerabilities in earlier generations of mobile networks
were addressed through improvements in the following gener-
ations. However, the backward compatibility of systems and
attack vectors for downgrade attacks render such vulnerabil-
ities a continuing problem. Two factors are responsible for
downgrade attacks: unsecured pre-authentication traffic and
openness of the wireless channel. While protocol changes and
new cryptographic methods (e. g., asymmetric cryptography)
can address unsecured pre-authentication, the wireless channel
requires more fundamental changes to provide security against
jamming attacks. Future research must address the class of
downgrade attacks to overcome these issues.
A related problem are insecure inter-network protocols
(e. g., SS7 or Diameter) in such a way that these legacy
systems represent a threat to users as well as network
providers. While firewalls constitute a temporary solution,
research should develop inter-network protocols that keep the
misuse potential as low as possible by minimizing the number
of trusted entities.
Insecure implementations of network components (e. g.,
smartphones or core network) are an attack vector that un-
dermines the system’s integrity and immediately affects many
users. Research should focus on securing those implementa-
tions by adopting means of classical system security while
considering the requirements of the mobile network.
Resource usage asymmetry led to the so-called signaling
denial-of-service attacks. In future, the number of subscribers
and thus the threat of such an attack increases (e. g., by a
mobile phone botnet). Therefore, research should investigate
protocol designs in which the resource usage is more balanced
to mitigate the threat of signaling denial-of-service attacks.
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3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
AuC Authentication Center
DNS Domain Name System
DoS Denial of Service
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
EDGE Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution
eNodeB Evolved NodeB
EPC Evolved Packet Core
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
GCM Google Cloud Messaging
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
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SIM Key Extraction via COMP128v1 Cryptoanalysis
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Fig. 3. Visualization of Systematization including Attack Aims, Attacks, Causes, and Root Causes.
